The "reviewing product output instead of code" framing is the right direction for where development is heading, and the per thread VM model makes sense for isolation.
One dimension worth thinking through as you scale: the security surface of cloud-hosted agents is meaningfully different from local agents. Local agents (Cursor, Claude Code) have access to your local filesystem and credentials. Cloud agents have access to your cloud credentials, your production-adjacent infrastructure, and potentially your CI/CD pipeline and they run without the developer watching.
The MCP server porting during onboarding is the piece I'd think hardest about. MCP servers can have write access to config files, and the STDIO transport has a documented unsanitized parameter passthrough vulnerability (AVE-2026-00060, corroborated by OX Security and Microsoft) that affects Python, TS, Java, and Rust SDKs. When you're running hundreds of agents concurrently in the cloud, a single compromised MCP server has a much larger blast radius than a local one.
The "what the agent writes" security layer is separate from the "how the agent runs" security layer. Hoplite solves the second. Scanning what the agent wrote (SAST, secrets detection, dependency audit) before it gets merged is the complementary first layer. SafeWeave runs as an MCP server inside the agent's environment for exactly this works locally and in cloud agent setups.
Congrats on the launch. What's your current approach to credential scoping for agents that need cloud access?
One dimension worth thinking through as you scale: the security surface of cloud-hosted agents is meaningfully different from local agents. Local agents (Cursor, Claude Code) have access to your local filesystem and credentials. Cloud agents have access to your cloud credentials, your production-adjacent infrastructure, and potentially your CI/CD pipeline and they run without the developer watching.
The MCP server porting during onboarding is the piece I'd think hardest about. MCP servers can have write access to config files, and the STDIO transport has a documented unsanitized parameter passthrough vulnerability (AVE-2026-00060, corroborated by OX Security and Microsoft) that affects Python, TS, Java, and Rust SDKs. When you're running hundreds of agents concurrently in the cloud, a single compromised MCP server has a much larger blast radius than a local one.
The "what the agent writes" security layer is separate from the "how the agent runs" security layer. Hoplite solves the second. Scanning what the agent wrote (SAST, secrets detection, dependency audit) before it gets merged is the complementary first layer. SafeWeave runs as an MCP server inside the agent's environment for exactly this works locally and in cloud agent setups.
Congrats on the launch. What's your current approach to credential scoping for agents that need cloud access?